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Abstract: This paper investigates the dynamic implications of Krugman’s (1999) model of 
financial crises with balance-sheet effects, which has a considerable impact on the literature 
of international financial crisis. Considering explicitly the wealth-accumulation constraint and 
the external equilibrium condition, I describe an emerging-market financial crisis as a jump 
from an unstable dynamic trajectory to a stable one, instead of a jump from a “good” to a 
“bad” equilibrium with zero investment and zero foreign debt. By discriminating the financial 
crises according to the severity of the negative impacts of some internal and external factors, 
this paper also adds some insights into the anti-crisis policy.  
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1. Introduction
In  the  aftermath  of  1997  Asian  financial  crisis,  there  was  much  controversy  among 
economists about its origin and nature. A decade later, economists know much more about 
financial and currency crises even though the lessons from these crises are not fully learned.  
Currency  crisis  models  developed  before  the  1997  Asian  turmoil  are  relevant  in 
explaining  other  particular  crisis  in  the  1990s.  The  first-generation  models  focused  on 
budgetary deficits and the effect of its continuing monetary financing (e.g., Krugman (1979), 
Flood and Garber (1984)). The second-generation models (e.g., Obstfeld (1994), Sachs, et al. 
(1996))  highlighted  the  trade-off  between  employment  and  exchange  rate  stability  and 
explained the crisis as a jump between multiple equilibria. In most crisis countries of Asia, 
neither of these stories has much relevance. In terms of conventional fiscal indicators such as 
budgetary deficits, the governments of the distressed economies were in quite good shape at 
the beginning of 1997. While growth had slowed and some signs of excess capacity appeared 
in  1996,  none  of  them  faced  a  clear  trade-off  between  employment  and  exchange  rate 
stability. 
The third-generation models were then developed to answer the particular questions raised 
during the Asian crisis. A largely shared idea in these models is that the crisis should be seen 
as a result of a shock that is amplified by what Bernanke, et al. (1999) have called a financial 
accelerator mechanism.
1 Since firms’ assets and liabilities are denominated in domestic and 
foreign currency respectively, real depreciation can have a large effect on output if it affects 
the credit access of some agents by worsening their balance sheets. Then, this output effect 
may in turn affect the exchange rate, further amplifying the shock and causing it to persist. A 
                                                 
1 Another important strand of literature has argued that the core of the problem lies in the banking system 
(Corsetti, et al. (1999), Chang and Velasco (2001)).   2
large theoretical literature of financial crisis that focuses on the story of balance-sheet effects 
and leverage constraint has been developed into different directions.
2  
Krugman (1999) has noticed that the transfer problem, debated by Keynes and Ohlin in 
the 1920s, was central to what has happened to Asia. In effect, many authors were mainly 
concerned with the behavior of investors in one-good models and did not pay much attention 
to the movement in the terms of trade and the reversal in the current account. In practice, this 
reversal has been achieved partly through massive real depreciation, and partly through severe 
recession that produces a compression of imports. Krugman (1999) advances therefore the 
transfer problem as another way of explaining the Asian crisis: foreign currency debt and 
leveraged financing make the domestic economy fragile and prone to crisis. He has shown the 
existence of three equilibria with the crisis brought on by a pure shift in expectations, leading 
to a possible jump from an equilibrium with high investment to one with zero investment, 
suggesting persistent negative effects of real currency depreciation on output.  
Empirically, Upadhyaya and Upadhyay (1999) have found that currency devaluation in 
Asian countries generally fails to make any effect on output over any length of time. Kim and 
Ying  (2007)  have  even  observed  strongly  expansionary  effects  of  devaluation  in  several 
countries except for the crisis period. However, after currency devaluation, the level of GDP 
can  remain  permanently  below  its  initial  trend,  suggesting  that  the  shocks  underlying  a 
currency crisis are persistent (Hong and Tornell (2005)). Taking a long-term view, Bordo, et 
al.  (2010)  have  found  empirical  evidence  of  significant  permanent  output  losses  due  to 
financial crises driven by exposure to foreign currency debt. 
                                                 
2 For example, Mendoza (2002) has shown that a mismatch between the denomination of debt and income 
exacerbates financial crises. Aghion, et al. (2001, 2004a, b) have provided optimal monetary policy prescriptions 
when a crisis occurs in models integrating the credit side with the monetary side. Schneider and Tornell (2004) 
have  developed  a  model  based  on  sectoral  asymmetries  in  corporate  finance  with  currency  mismatch  and 
borrowing  constraints  arising  endogenously,  leading  to  self-fulfilling  crises.  For  a  survey,  see  Allen,  et  al. 
(2002).   3
The advances in the literature of international financial crisis, induced by the 1997 Asian 
crisis, have also great pertinence for understanding the repercussions of subprime crisis on 
Iceland and Central and Eastern European countries (Krugman (2010)). In effect, many of 
these countries have large amount of debt denominated in foreign currencies (e.g, Sirtaine and 
Skamnelos  (2007),  Von  Hagen  and  Siedschlag  (2008),  Buiter  and  Sibert  (2009),  and 
Danielsson (2009)) and they are vulnerable to a real devaluation or depreciation, exactly as in 
the 1997 Asian crisis. It is surprising that the great lessons of the Asian crisis are not learned.
3  
In  this  context,  it  is  particularly  interesting  to  revisit  Krugman’s  (1999)  model, 
distinguished by its profound insights and its capability of dealing with a large number of 
issues on currency and foreign debt crisis. It is among the early models to draw the attention 
of economists on issues of debt composition and particularly currency denomination, and has 
had a large impact on the twin crisis literature. It can still give good insights into the recent 
twin crisis affecting Iceland and some Central and Eastern European countries.  
We remark  that,  ignoring  the  wealth-accumulation constraint  and external equilibrium 
condition, Krugman (1999) has reached the following intriguing result: a crisis is a jump from 
a good equilibrium with high investment and high foreign-currency debt to a bad equilibrium 
with zero investment and zero foreign debt. This prediction is not verified by the empirical 
evidence and is hard to understand from a theoretical point of view. Therefore, the central 
objective of this paper is to reexamine the relevance of this theoretical result by providing a 
dynamic analysis of Krugman’s model. For this purpose, I introduce the wealth-accumulation 
constraint and the external equilibrium condition while making some additional assumptions 
to ensure the tractability of the model. This extension allows us to examine from another point 
of view the mechanism of financial crisis driven by the exposure to foreign currency debt. 
                                                 
3 A debate emerged in the late 1990s regarding the causes of the prevalence of foreign currency denominated 
foreign  debt  in  emerging  markets.  Some  saw  it  as  a  consequence  of  moral  hazard.  Hausmann  (1999)  and 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (2000) advanced the “original sin hypothesis”. Eichengreen, et al. (2005) have 
argued that it was not a mere consequence of bad policies or institutions.   4
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the model. 
The  section  after  describes  the  steady  state  equilibrium.  Section  4  examines  the  model’s 
dynamic properties and the mechanism of financial crisis. Section 5 discusses some factors 
inducing  financial  fragility  or  crisis.  Section  6  analyzes  the  policy  implications.  The  last 
section concludes. 
2. The model 
The extended version of the small open-economy model of Krugman (1999) is as follows:  
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where  t y   denotes  the  output,  t K   the  stock  of  physical  capital,  t L   the  labor,  t I   the 
investment,  t C  the consumption,  t p  the real exchange rate (or the relative price of foreign 
goods ),  t X  the domestic exports,  t W  the net wealth of domestic entrepreneurs,  t D  and  t F  
the domestic and foreign currency denominated debt respectively, and  t r  and 
*
t r  the domestic   5
and foreign real interest rate respectively. Among these variables,  t y ,  t I ,  t C ,  t W  and  t D  are 
measured in terms of domestic goods,  t K  in terms of investment goods which is built using 
domestic and foreign goods,  t X  and  t F  in terms of foreign goods.  
Equation (1) presents the Cobb-Douglas production function of the small open economy 
that produces a single good each period using capital and labor. The capital is assumed to last 
only one period so that this period’s capital, once measured in domestic goods, is equal to the 
last period’s investment. We assume that the flexibility on the labor market will ensure full 
employment and the labor supply is normalized to unity so that  t   , 1 . # t L .  
Equation (2) describes the market clearing condition for domestic goods. The domestic 
demand functions are based on the assumption that domestic residents are divided into two 
distinct classes. Workers, who receive a share  ! " (  of domestic income, lack access to the 
capital market and spend all their income within each period. Entrepreneurs create and own 
domestic capital by saving and investing all their income until the exhaustion of domestic 
investment opportunities and then they are assumed to consume the surplus of their revenue 
over investment.
4 In the periods where entrepreneurs do not consume, domestic consumption 
and investment are equal to workers’ income and entrepreneurs’ income respectively. The 
domestic and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes with unitary elasticity of substitution. 
Thus, a share  * " (  of both consumption and investment is spent on domestic goods, and  *  
on imports. The value of domestic exports in terms of foreign goods is assumed to be fixed 
with  X Xt # , i.e. the foreign elasticity of substitution is also unitary. 
Equation  (3)  is  obtained  using  (2).  It  expresses  the  domestic  real  exchange  rate  as  a 
function increasing in domestic output and investment but decreasing in exports.  
                                                 
4  We  introduce  this  assumption  to  close  the  small  open-economy  model  to  avoid  that  these  entrepreneurs 
accumulate an infinite amount of wealth. This assumption might not be plausible for describing some emerging 
economies having sufficiently accumulated capital. As illustrated by recent international developments of South 
Korean  firms,  ambitious  entrepreneurs  might  be  tempted  to  invest  on  international  financial  assets  and/or 
industrial projects. See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) for other ways of closing the model.   6
Inequality (4) specifies that the ability of domestic entrepreneurs to invest is limited by 
their  wealth  in  the  way  of  Bernanke  et  al.  (1999).  Lenders  impose  a  limit  on  leverage, 
justified  by  motives  such  as  the  risk  of  bankruptcy  and  asymmetric  information.  Hence, 
entrepreneurs can borrow at most ) 1 ( + % times their wealth.  
Equation (5) shows that the return of domestic bonds is equal to the marginal productivity 
of capital. Because a share  *  of investment falls on foreign goods, the price index for last 
period’s investment goods relative to that of domestic output is 
* "
"1 t p . One unit of domestic 
good saved in t allows buying 
* "
t p  units of capital before the production takes place and 
therefore  the  return  on  domestic  bonds  should  (by  arbitrage)  be  equal  to 
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According to (6), entrepreneurs will not borrow beyond the point at which the real return 
on domestic investment, determined by (5), equals that on foreign bonds. It is similar to 
uncovered interest rates parity (UIRP), which compares the rate of return of foreign bonds 
*
t r  
and the return (converted into foreign goods at  1 % t p ) that can be achieved with domestic 
investment equivalent to a unity of foreign goods (converted into domestic goods at  t p ).  
Equation (7) imposes that investment cannot be negative.  
Equation (8) defines the net wealth of entrepreneurs as the difference between a share !  
of domestic revenue attributed to the owners of domestic capital and the actual value of the 
debt that they owe, at an aggregate level, to international lenders. The income accruing to 
capital ( t y ! ) also represents the value of domestic capital which lasts only one period.  
Equation (9) describes the evolution of foreign debt used by domestic entrepreneurs to 
finance an investment greater than their wealth. It represents their balance-sheet constraint.  
Equation (10) represents the external equilibrium condition or balance of payments. Under 
a flexible exchange rate regime (i.e.,  0 # ee B ), it can be obtained by combining (2), (8) and   7
(9).  It  implies  that  a  temporary  current  account  deficit  can  be  financed  by  the  inflow  of 
capital. In the long term, a trade balance surplus must be generated to ensure the interest 
payments on foreign debt. 
Equations  (9)  and  (10)  represent  the  logic  extension  of  Krugman’s  model.  They  are 
important to our understanding of the dynamic features of a crisis-prone economy.  
Assume that entrepreneurs are risk neutral and maximize their firms’ profits in period t. If  









* * ! ! ! , i.e. the marginal rate of return of capital is higher than the cost of 
financing investment, entrepreneurs will borrow from abroad the maximal amount allowed by 
the leverage constraint (4) which is therefore binding. Otherwise, (4) will not be binding.  
At  the  equilibrium  on  the  international  financial  market,  the  absence  of  arbitrage 
opportunity between domestic and foreign currency denominated bonds implies that (6) is 
verified with equality: 
t t t t p r r p ) 1 ( ) 1 (
*
1 % # % % .              (11) 
The ratio of foreign currency (or goods) denominated debt relative to domestic currency 
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The ratio /  can be arbitrarily modified to examine the effect of its variation on economic 
equilibrium. In the following,  t D  is simply named “foreign debt” even though the “total 
foreign debt” is a multiple of it, i.e.  t t t t t D vp F p D ) 1 ( % # % . 
Foreign banks would pay attention to the wealth left to entrepreneurs after the payment of 
principal and interests. Using (1) with 
* "
" " # 1 1 t t t p I K , (8) and (11)-(12), we obtain:  
                                                 
5 This assumption partially reflects the original sin hypothesis advanced by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) 
who define it as a situation in which the domestic currency cannot be used to borrow abroad or to borrow long 
term even domestically, and modified by Eichengreen, et al. (2005) who discard the domestic element of original 
sin and redefine original sin as a situation in which most countries cannot borrow abroad in their own currency.   8
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If  0 , t W , no bank will lend to these entrepreneurs and therefore they will bankrupt and invest 
zero.  For a given wealth  0 W , (13) is rewritten as: 
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An iso-wealth curve represents the combinations of foreign debt and investment that ensure a 
constant wealth. A given combination of investment and foreign debt ( 0 I , 0 D ) can correspond 
to different wealth levels, according to parameters. A counterclockwise rotation of the curve 
Iso-wealth around C to Iso-wealth bis implies a fall in wealth, i.e.  0
'
0 W W $  .
6  
                           I                                                     Iso-wealth bis (
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0 W ) 
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Fig. 1: Iso-wealth curve.  
The model has nine endogenous variables and is solved in two steps. The first step of the 
resolution consists to solve the difference equations for  t p ,  t I   and  t D . In the second step, we 
can solve for  t y ,  t C ,  t K ,  t r ,  t W  and  t F . Substituting  t y  given by (1) into (3) yields: 
                                                 
6 According to (14), this is the case when there is: i) an increase in 
*
t r  that reduces entrepreneurs’ wealth; ii) a 
decrease in X, since this implies according to (3) a real depreciation, decreasing the current value of domestic 
product but increasing the value of foreign debt measured in domestic currency; iii) an increase in  *  that, by 
increasing the demand for foreign goods, implies a real depreciation and hence has a similar effect as a decrease 
in X. However, an increase in  !  has ambiguous effects on the wealth. It induces an increase in the revenue 
attributed to capitalists as well as a real depreciation (due to higher productivity of existing capital and hence 
higher output, and higher part of revenue that is exported) with the above-mentioned effects. Finally, a variation 
of +  has no effect on the iso-wealth curve.   9
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Under  the  assumption  that  the  risk-neutral  entrepreneurs,  when  their  wealth  is  low 
enough, use the leverage financing so that (4) is binding, i.e.  t t W I ) 1 ( + % # . Combining the 
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The dynamics of  t D , representing the country’s external debt, is described equivalently by 
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Difference  equations  (15)-(17)  describe  the  dynamic  behavior  of  real  exchange  rate, 
investment and foreign debt. They are non-linear and cannot be solved explicitly. However, 
the  static  and  dynamic  properties of  the  system  can  be  studied  with  the  help  of  a  phase 
diagram. 
3. Steady state equilibrium 
The steady state equilibrium, where variables are denoted by an upper bar, is attained when 
the  dynamic  effects  of  shocks  are  fully  realized.  Since  optimal  investment  verifies 
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Given 
* r ,  the  highest  steady  state  investment,  I ˆ ,  equalizes  the  marginal  productivity  of 
capital and the opportunity cost of investing.  
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The steady state equilibrium of the reduced dynamic system is defined by the vector (I ,  p , 
D ). Given  I , (19) determines  ) (I p 0 # . Equation (20) corresponds to the combination of 
investment and foreign debt along the quickest wealth-accumulation path limited by condition 
(18). Given the real exchange rate, it would determine a “financeable” level of investment that 
would occur if (4) was binding and the maximal credit (or debt capacity) that could be granted 
to domestic firms. Equation (21) is the solvency constraint of entrepreneurs, which implies 
that the surplus of wealth over investment is equal to interest payments on foreign debt. Since 
the foreign debt is uniquely contracted by entrepreneurs, their solvency constraint is also the 
economy’s  external  solvency  constraint.  Thus,  (21)  is  equivalent  to  the  steady  state 
counterpart of (10) meaning that, in the long-run, the trade surplus must be equal to interest 
payments on foreign debt. 
Substituting  ) (I p 0 #  into (20)-(21) and rearranging the terms lead to 
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where 
inv D   and 
ee D denote,  for  all  levels  of  investment,  the  highest  steady  state  debt 
compatible  with  the  leverage  constraint  and  the  external  solvency  constraint  respectively. 
Equations (22)-(23) constitute a sub-system incorporating the effects of the real exchange rate 
on wealth, i.e. balance sheets, and can be solved to obtain I  and D  taking account of (18).  
The curves 
inv D  and  
ee D  could be represented as in Fig. 2 where  id I
~
 represents the 
intersection point of these two curves, and I
~
 and  d I  respectively the higher intersection point   11
of 
inv D   and 
ee D   with  the  axe  I   (see  Appendix  A).  At  high  levels  of  I, the  leverage 
constraint  (4)  will  not  bind.  Instead,  investment  is  determined  using  (5)  and  (11)  and  is 
consequently  limited  to  I ˆ   with  id I I
~ ˆ $ .  Using  (18)  and  id I I
~ ˆ $ ,  the  set  of  feasible 
combinations of debt and investment is constituted of AB (i.e.,  I I ˆ # ) and OB (i.e., the dark 
part  on  the  curve 
inv D ).  For  I I ˆ $ ,  risk-neutral  entrepreneurs  will  fully  use  their  debt 
capacity allowed by (4) corresponding to the most rapid wealth growth. When  I ˆ  is attained, 
entrepreneurs will reduce the leverage to a level smaller than  ) 1 ( + % .  
   I                          
  I
~
    
   d I          
inv D  
                             
                          id I
~
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ee D                            
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Fig. 2:  Steady state equilibria. 
The relative position of 
inv D  and 
ee D depends on the value of X, 
* r   * ,  v and  ! . 
Whereas +  is a determinant of 
inv D , it does not affect 
ee D . These two curves rotate counter-
clockwise around O if:  i) X decreases, implying a depreciation of the real exchange rate. This 
will increase the value of foreign currency debt when measured in domestic currency; ii) 
* r  
rises, increasing financial burden of foreign debt; iii)  *  increases, leading to a similar effect 
as a decrease in X. An increase in v also induces a counterclockwise rotation of these curves 
around O. Since it is equivalent to an increase of total foreign debt, to keep foreign debt at a 
constant  level  compatible  with  the  leverage  and  external  solvency  constraints,  domestic   12
currency debt must be reduced. An increase in +  expands proportionally the debt capacity of 
entrepreneurs,  leading  to  clockwise  rotation  of 
inv D ,  but  has  no  effect  on  the  external 
solvency constraint. Finally, an increase in !  has ambiguous effects on these curves. 
The foreign debt is assumed to be non negative, i.e.  0 - % F p D ,  I . , translating the 
assumption that, after having exhausted domestic investment opportunities, entrepreneurs will 
consume the surplus of their revenue over investment. Therefore, there are only two steady 
state equilibria, i.e. the point A where foreign debt is zero and investment equals  I ˆ , and the 
point O where they are both zero because entrepreneurs have no collateral. Since  id I I
~ ˆ $ , the 
intersection point of 
inv D  and 
ee D  is not a steady state equilibrium. 
4. Dynamics and mechanism of financial crisis 
Since  the  difference  equations  (15)-(17)  are  non  linear,  it  is  not  possible  to  deduce 
algebraically the sign of  1 " " # 1 t t t I I I  and  1 " " # 1 t t t D D D  in the different areas of the space 
( I D, ) for the purpose of drawing a phase diagram.
7 We use the economic analysis to deduce 
the sign of  t I 1  and  t D 1  in order to draw the phase diagram represented in Fig. 3. 
At the right (left) of 
ee D , because the external debt is too high (low) in the sense that the 
trade surplus is not sufficient to pay interests on the existing foreign debt and the latter keeps 
increasing due to the current account deficit,  t D 1  has positive sign and is represented by 
arrows pointing to the right (left respectively). Under the line AB and at the left of 
inv D , the 
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D , we have  0 $ 1 t I  and vice versa. In the space delimitated by 
inv D  and the axe I, and above the line AB, the 
lack  of  profitability  leads  rational  entrepreneurs  to  reduce  investment.  Using  (17)  to  obtain 
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we have  0 2 1 t D  and vice versa.   13
foreign debt is smaller than the debt capacity of entrepreneurs. Thus, the latter can invest 
more  and  more  to  increase  their  wealth,  implying  that  t I 1   has  a  positive  sign  and  is 
represented by up arrows in area 1. Above the line AB, investment is too high in the sense 
that its marginal rate of return is smaller than that offered by the international financial market 
and it must be reduced. Under the line AB and at the right of 
inv D , the foreign debt is too 
high to satisfy the leverage constraint and the wealth will be insufficient to sustain the past 
level of investment. Thus, investment must be reduced, implying down arrows for areas 2-7. 
I                          
  I
~
    
   d I    6   
inv D  
                             
                          id I
~
                           4       Iso-wealth ( 0 W )             
                                   7           5 
                         I ˆ   A           B                           
                                   1          C     
ee D                            
                                             2              3                              
O                                                           D 
Fig. 3:  Phase diagram and multiple equilibria.
The  equilibrium  A  is  stable  since  any  trajectory  originated  in  its  near  neighborhood 
converges to it. The equilibrium O is unstable because a small wealth is sufficient to start a 
wealth accumulation process with more and more investment and foreign debt, finally leading 
the economy to the equilibrium A. A more detailed discussion, distinguishing seven areas in 
Fig. 3, makes clearer the underlying dynamics of investment and foreign debt.  
In area 1 (area ABO), bounded at the above by the line AB and at the right by 
inv D , the 
foreign debt is smaller than the debt capacity determined by the leverage constraint (4) and is 
compatible with the external solvency constraint. Risk-averse entrepreneurs choose a path in 
the interior of area 1. Given the high rate of return on investment, the wealth accumulation is   14
delayed by not fully using the debt capacity. However, risk neutral entrepreneurs tend to use 
totally the debt capacity to enrich themselves as quickly as possible, i.e. along the curve OB. 
They will reduce their debt and invest more by using their own wealth once I ˆ  is attained. The 
path OB could lead to financial crisis in the event of adverse shocks or when lenders turn 
pessimistic about the perspectives of the domestic economy. 
In area 2, delimited by the line prolonging AB, the curve 
ee D  and the curve OB, the 
foreign debt is higher than the debt capacity but is compatible with the external solvency 
constraint. In this area, entrepreneurs are constrained to reduce investment in order to reduce 
the foreign debt. The realized temporary equilibrium after adjustment of the international 
lending can be more or less favorable, depending on the confidence of international lenders 
placed on these entrepreneurs and on the perspectives of the domestic economy. Given a 
wealth  0 W , instead of reducing their lending to a level corresponding to a point like C on the 
curve OB, the herd behavior could lead international lenders to reduce lending to zero. In this 
case,  t I  will jump to  0 W . Such an adjustment could happen only when the debt is short run. 
In area 3, at the right of the curve 
ee D  and under the line prolonging AB, the foreign debt 
exceeds  the  limit  imposed  by  leverage  and  external  solvency  constraints.  Entrepreneurs 
cannot pay back the debt without reducing investment. Before the foreign debt becomes too 
large, lenders could recover all or most of their lending. If they wait, the situation could 
deteriorate so that they make a loss while most entrepreneurs bankrupt. 
In area 4, above the line prolonging AB and bordered at the left by the curve 
inv D for 
id I I
~
2  and the curve 
ee D  for  [
~
, ˆ ] id I I I 3 , the investment is higher than  I ˆ , and the foreign 
debt  exceeds  the  level  compatible  with  both  leverage  and  external  solvency  constraints.   15
Entrepreneurs must reduce the investment to  I ˆ. Meanwhile, international lenders could react 
negatively to the over-investment except when the foreign debt is low and the wealth high.  
In area 5, between curves 
inv D  and 
ee D  with  [
~
, ˆ ] id I I I 3 , investment is higher than  I ˆ . 
Even  if  the  external  solvency  constraint  is  respected,  the  foreign  debt  exceeds  the  level 
compatible  with  the  leverage  constraint.  The  entrepreneurs,  constrained  by  lenders,  must 
reduce investment to I ˆ. Due to modest debt levels and high wealth, the risk of crisis is small.  
In area 6, between curves 
inv D  and 
ee D  with  id I I
~
2 , investment is higher than  I ˆ  and 
the  foreign  debt,  which  is  smaller  than  the  debt  capacity  determined  by  the  leverage 
constraint, exceeds the level compatible with the external solvency constraint. Entrepreneurs 
must reduce investment to  I ˆ and the foreign debt correspondingly. Otherwise, the foreign 
debt  will  increase  due  to  unpaid  interests  and  well-informed  international  lenders  would 
consider that the increasing current account deficit is not sustainable in the long term. 
In  area  7,  above  the  line  AB,  bordered  by  the  curves 
ee D ,  [ ,
~
] d id I I I 3 .   and 
inv D , 
[
~
, ˆ ] id I I I 3 . ,  investment  is  higher  than  I ˆ .  The  foreign  debt  is  compatible  with  both 
constraints. Entrepreneurs reduce investment and foreign debt until the point A is attained. In 
this area, reducing both investment and foreign debt is optimal and feasible. An outburst of 
financial crisis is improbable since wealth is high with regard to the debt. 
As in Krugman (1999), the foreign debt capacity of entrepreneurs depends on their wealth, 
which in its turn depends on the amount of such debt because the volume of capital inflows 
affects  the  terms  of  trade  and  hence  the  valuation  of  foreign-currency  denominated  debt. 
Therefore, a decline in capital inflows can adversely affect the balance sheets of domestic 
entrepreneurs, reducing their ability to borrow and hence further reducing capital inflows.
8 In 
                                                 
8 It is largely documented that the Asian countries affected by 1997 financial crisis had a balance of payments 
characterized by large current account deficits compensated by net inflows of foreign capital.   16
the interior of areas 1 and 7, the probability of such a crisis is zero and there will be nothing 
that resembles an Asian-style financial crisis. However, on the curve OB and at the left of this 
curve (areas 2-5), the risk of financial crisis depends positively on the level of debt and 
negatively on the level of wealth. In the area 6, there is not any financial risk in the short run. 
A  prosperous  economy  pursuing  a  quick  wealth-accumulation  path  like  OB  can  be 
suddenly hit by a capital outflow due to spill-over effects (Masson, 1999), i.e. crisis in one 
country may affect other emerging markets by contagion due to linkages operating through 
trade, economic activities or competitiveness. A typical example is a currency devaluation of 
a  rival  country  in  crisis,  which  reduces  domestic  exports.  In  such  an  event,  an  economy 
initially on the path OB could be found at the right of 
inv D  or in the worst case at the right of 
ee D  as these curves rotate counter-clockwise following a fall in exports. This could make the 
initial  temporary  equilibrium  with  high  investment  and  high  foreign  debt  unsustainable 
judging by the leverage constraint and/or the external equilibrium condition. If the leverage 
constraint is violated while the external solvency constraint is respected, the panic of lenders 
and the resulting financial crisis might not be too severe since the reduction of liquidity in the 
domestic economy will not bankrupt most entrepreneurs. In effect, a reduction in exports will 
negatively impact the entrepreneurs’ wealth (the iso-wealth curve rotates counter-clockwise) 
since it implies a real depreciation and hence an increase in the value of foreign-currency debt 
measured in domestic currency. If both constraints are violated, the panic of lenders and the 
resulting financial crisis would be much severe. To analyze the severity of a crisis, one must 
appropriately consider factors such as initial wealth, leverage multiplier, amplitude of the fall 
in exports and other structural parameters of the economy. For emerging market economies 
that initially offer a high rate of return of capital, the crisis could result from earlier choices of 
entrepreneurs who underestimate the effects of adverse shocks on the financial stability and 
their repercussion on the rate of return of the capital.   17
Any temporary equilibrium along the curve OB is submitted to the risk that a loss of 
lenders’ confidence could be validated by a financial collapse if these lenders radically change 
their  attitude  and  behavior  towards  domestic  entrepreneurs.  In  normal  times,  domestic 
entrepreneurs could finance their investment by fully using the debt capacity determined by 
the leverage constraint. But in bad times (e.g., a financial crisis hits other emerging market 
economies), as the debt is short-run, panicking international lenders could arbitrarily reduce 
the leverage multiplier to a level that guarantees the repayment of principal and interests, 
translating  an  increase  in  their  risk  aversion  or  a  loss  of  their  confidence  on  future 
perspectives of the domestic or/and world economy. This induces the curve 
inv D  to rotate 
counter-clockwise while the curves 
ee D  and iso-wealth remain unaffected. A reduction in the 
leverage multiplier might not be sufficient to lead a financial crisis to occur except when the 
pessimistic expectations of lenders are realized. If wealth is not affected, investment and 
foreign debt will adjust orderly towards lower levels. 
Under a flexible exchange rate regime, a severe and instantaneous reduction of investment 
and foreign debt can take place when some shocks modify hugely and adversely the current 
and  future  real  exchange  rates.  Lenders  would  examine  attentively  to  what  extent  any 
important shock of this kind will reduce entrepreneurs’ wealth and hence increase the risk of 
economic  and  financial  collapse  leading  to  a  low  level  of  investment  and  wealth.  This 
scenario is more probable when investment and foreign debt are both jumping variables. If 
investment is only partially amortized in every period and the foreign debt is long term, the 
immediate collapse will be less severe. However, the financial crisis, while less violent than 
the one with sudden withdrawal of foreign lending, could be long-lasting if appropriate policy 
measures are not taken by national authorities and/or international financial institutions. 
Even though the basic part of this model is the same as in Krugman, the discussion here is 
somewhat different. In fact, Krugman worked with three equilibria that are made possible by   18
using a static analysis. A financial crisis then corresponds to a jump from the equilibrium with 
high investment to the one with zero investment since all entrepreneurs are bankrupt, given 
that the intermediate equilibrium is unstable. Examining the dynamic model, we have shown 
that  that  there  are  only  two  steady  state  equilibria.  A  financial  crisis  is  then  a  dynamic 
phenomenon  of  an  emerging  market  economy  that  uses  extensively  foreign  currency 
denominated debt to finance its development. It is a jump, susceptible to occur when some 
factors make international lenders panicking, from one dynamically unstable trajectory of 
wealth-accumulation with high foreign debt and high investment to another trajectory with 
less  investment  and  lower  foreign  debt.  When  a  severe  financial  crisis  occurs,  not  all 
entrepreneurs  are  systematically  bankrupt.  The  economic  and  financial  collapse  does  not 
imply that the previous investments were unsound. The problem is instead one of financial 
fragility in a dynamic context. 
5.  Other factors at the origin of financial fragility and crisis 
We have previously analyzed the mechanism of financial crisis using the example of a crisis 
by  contagion.  The  financial  fragility  in  this  model  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  mismatch 
between short-term debt and long-term investments, nor does it appear to depend on foreign 
exchange reserves. In the following, we reexamine, in the dynamic setting, factors such as 
high leverage, low marginal propensity to import and large foreign-currency debt relative to 
exports that Krugman (1999) consider as potential causes of financial collapse. The effects 
induced by monetary policy shocks in industrial countries are also discussed.  
High leverage increases the speed of wealth accumulation by domestic entrepreneurs but 
also accelerates the wealth destruction when the economy is hit by adverse shocks. It makes 
the economy more vulnerable to a negative change in lender’s attitudes towards domestic 
entrepreneurs. An increase in leverage, i.e. a higher  + , will induce the curve 
inv D  to rotate   19
clockwise  without  modifying  the  position  of 
ee D .  Whatever  is  the  value  of  + , 
inv D   is 
always at the left of 
ee D ,  I I ˆ $ . . The new quickest wealth-accumulation path OB’ will be 
nearer  to  the  external  solvency  constraint  (see  Fig.  4).  This  increases  the  fragility  of  the 
economy  by  increasing  the  probability  that  the  economy  violates  not  only  the  leverage 
constraint but also the external solvency constraint in the event of negative shocks inducing 
these constraints to rotate counterclockwise (not drawn in Fig. 4).  
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Fig. 4:  High leverage and steady state equilibrium.
A  lower  marginal  propensity  to  import  will  induce  a  higher  domestic  production  and 
hence a higher revenue (or wealth) for domestic entrepreneurs, leading the latter to increase 
the foreign debt. Graphically (figure not drawn here), a decrease in the marginal propensity to 
import will induce the curves 
inv D  and 
ee D  to rotate clockwise with the later being more 
sensible.  A  higher  foreign  debt  will  increase  the  sensitivity  of  the  economy  to  shocks 
negatively affecting the terms of trade. Hence, it will increase the fragility of the economy and 
reduce the latter’s capability of buffering against adverse shocks. 
The ratio of foreign-currency debt relative to exports is a complex indicator which is not 
clearly discussed by Krugman. A large ratio of foreign-currency debt relative to exports can 
be due to multiple factors. Using (12) and (22), the ratio can be written as:   20
X r I v





) 1 )]( ( 1 )[ 1 (
} )] ( [ ) 1 ( { ) (





0 + ! 0
!* !
.      (24) 
An increase in  v,  *  and  + , and an decrease in 
* r  and  X  could lead domestic firms to 
increase the foreign currency debt, implying an increase in the ratio  X
pF , while an increase in 
!  has an ambiguous effect. A larger ratio  X
pF  will make these firms more vulnerable to a 
financial crisis because, in the event of such a crisis, the outflows of capital must be financed 
by the surplus of the trade balance. The ratio  X
pF  also depends on investment and hence the 
stage of economic development. It is to notice that some parameters or exogenous variables, 
such as + , 
* r  and  X , can vary adversely and brutally, leading to a financial crisis.  
Generally, the above-mentioned factors leading to the financial fragility could also induce 
a  financial  crisis  if  they  come  to  change  adversely.  They  matter  because  they  make  the 
circular  loop  from  past  investment  to  real  exchange  rate  to  balance  sheets  to  current 
investment more powerful. But they didn’t explain why Asian financial crisis occured. All 
afflicted  Asian  economies  were  peculiarly  vulnerable  to  a  financial  crisis  due  to  a  high 
leverage and unusually high levels of foreign currency debt. These borrowings have placed 
them before an increased risk of financial collapse if the real exchange rate depreciates.  
The monsoonal effects could be one possible explanation of the 1997 Asian crisis. The 
monsoonal  effects  emanate  from  the  global  environment  (in  particular,  from  policies  in 
industrial  countries),  and  sweep  over  all  emerging  countries  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent 
(Masson  (1999)).  Thus,  a  monetary  contraction  in  the  world  leading  country  could 
considerably raise the financial costs of investment for an indefinite horizon and hence put 
some  emerging  market  economies  under  great  financial  pressures.  One  important  factor, 
which is present before the Asian financial crisis, is the high 3-month Libor interest rate 
(Kwack, 2000). In effect, previous to the crisis, the Fed has adopted a restrictive stance for its   21
monetary  policy,  inducing  the  interest  rate  to  rise  on  international  financial  markets. 
According to (18) and (22)-(23), an increase in 
* r  shifts the line AB downward and induces 
the curves 
inv D  and 
ee D  and hence the curve OB to rotate counter-clockwise. An increase in 
the foreign interest rate reduces the foreign funds that domestic entrepreneurs can borrow 
because it diminishes their wealth and hence their debt capacity. If wealth is high enough at 
the initial temporary equilibrium, the resulting adjustment can place the economy on the new 
wealth-accumulation path. If wealth is low, the foreign debt can instantly jump to a low level 
if it is short term and hence induces a violent financial crisis. Increasing the part of long term 
debt reduces the severity of the crisis but can make the latter long-lasting. 
6. Policy analysis  
The  dynamic  setting  can  be  easily  used  to  reexamine  three  policy  issues  considered  by 
Krugman (1999), i.e. preventive measures against financial crisis, policy during the financial 
crisis and rebuilding the economy after the financial crisis. It is to notice that the present 
framework, formulated in non-monetary terms, is more adapted for analyzing the situation of 
emerging market economies exposed to foreign currency debt under floating exchange rate 
regime.
9  However,  an  exchange  rate  peg  can  be  mimicked  by  a  real  exchange  rate  peg. 
Henceforward, we do not explicitly consider the exchange rate peg in the following. 
Regarding the preventive measures against financial crisis, Krugman has argued that the 
imposition  of  Chilean-type  restrictions  on  short-term  borrowing  denominated  in  foreign 
currencies,  which  reduces  the  short-term  foreign-currency  exposure,  could  not  allow 
emerging market countries to significantly reduce the risks of being forced into a crisis by a 
loss of confidence. In addition, as long as a country has free convertibility of capital, short-
term foreign loans are only one of many different possible sources of capital flight. Our 
dynamic analysis allows a more nuanced analysis since we can consider the case where only a 
                                                 
9 This is to some extent the case in most Central and Eastern European countries and Iceland.    22
small part of foreign loans is short term, foreign debt will not be a totally free jumping 
variable and will not fall to zero whenever there is a financial crisis.  
Consider again the example of a contagious financial crisis in a competing country, which 
decreases the expected exports of the domestic country in the future. As analyzed in section 4, 
such an event reduces the sustainable level of foreign loans by reducing the entrepreneurs’ net 
wealth,  leading  all  three  curves 
inv D , 
inv D   and  iso-wealth  to  rotate  counterclockwise. 
Therefore,  a  temporary  equilibrium  on  the  quickest  wealth-accumulation  path  before  the 
financial crisis is not anymore sustainable. Denote by 
'
inv D  the new location to which rotates 
counterclockwise the curve 
inv D . A high level of long-term foreign debt implies that the 
financial crisis could be less violent but long-lasting. The refusal of the holders of short-term 
foreign debt to roll it over could generate an exchange rate depreciation that deteriorates the 
balance sheets and bankrupts some entrepreneurs until the foreign debt is sufficiently low (i.e. 
at left of the curve 
'
inv D ). Nonetheless, a higher rate of return of capital allows entrepreneurs 
having survived the crisis to regain the confidence of international lenders.  
The nuances that we introduce in the analysis of the impact of the financial crisis does not 
put into question Krugman’s proposition about the appropriate prophylactic policy, i.e., to 
avoid any transmission of international crisis to the domestic economy, it is necessary to 
discourage  firms  from  taking  on  foreign-currency-denominated  debt  of  any  maturity.  In 
effect,  the  real-exchange-rate  impact  of  adverse  shocks  has  negative  effects  on  domestic 
investment financed with such debt but let unaffected an economy without it. These effects 
are magnified through balance-sheet effects to cause economic distress if such debt is high. 
The  dynamic  setting  can  be  used  to  analyze  the  policies  adopted  during  the  Asian 
financial crisis. In the period before 1997, Asian countries have grown rapidly and liberalized 
their capital account as urged by the IMF while operating a nominal exchange rate peg. The   23
peg of Asian monies to the US dollar is an important characteristic of these countries. To 
avoid the risks of financial trauma due to the foreign currency debt was a major reason why 
the IMF advised its Asian client countries to follow the much-criticized “IMF strategy” which 
consists to defend their currencies with high interest rates rather than simply letting them 
devaluate.
10  We can get some insight at the nature and consequences of the IMF strategy by 
imagining that the effect of that strategy is to hold the real exchange rate p constant even 
when the willingness of international lenders to finance investment declines.
11 Stabilizing the 
nominal and real exchange rates, while closing one channel for a potential financial collapse, 
opens another: according to equation (8), increasing strongly domestic interest rate hence the 
interest rate paid to international lenders implies that the sustainable level of foreign debt is 
drastically reduced, especially when leverage is high.  
The phase diagram (Fig. 3) can be modified to examine such type of policy in the case 
where the domestic economy is submitted to a contagious crisis.
12 Even though the contagion 
by the crisis in neighbor countries leads international lenders to think that the foreign debt is 
too high for the leverage constraint to be respected, the above measure is justified if the level 
of investment before the crisis is less than I ˆ  and if the foreign debt is always compatible with 
the  external  solvency  constraint.  The  anticipated  depreciation  of  domestic  currency  (and 
hence that of the real exchange rate) indicates a possible temporary equilibrium with smaller 
wealth and lower investment following a counterclockwise rotation of the curves iso-wealth 
and 
inv D . Hence, maintaining the temporary equilibrium at the point C can consume much 
                                                 
10 One mistake of the Thailand’s government is to raise local interest rate since the interest rate parity theorem 
tells us that those speculators who have already sold short baht in the forward market will be enriched, not hurt. 
Moreover, it can hurt entrepreneurs and hence precipitate a financial crisis (Miller (1998)).  
11 A controversy measure used by Malaysia during the 1997 crisis, imposing a strict curfew on capital flight and 
which is not discussed in order to limit the length of the paper, could also rule out the possibility of a downward 
financial spiral by maintaining the real exchange rate constant. In Fig. 3, it consists to maintain the economy at 
the point C by keeping unchanged the real exchange rate and by not letting the foreign lenders reducing their 
lending. It is justified by the fact that standstill agreements on foreign-currency debt are not sufficient to avoid 
the crisis. It is efficient only if the adverse shocks are temporary and over-investment not observed. 
12 For detailed analysis about how the curves shift, see section 4.   24
financial resources given that some foreign lenders will reduce their lending. To maintain the 
level of investment corresponding to the point C, the IMF’s financial aid must be enough to 
compensate the credit lost by firms so as to allow investment to continue. If the IMF funds are 
used to defend the nominal exchange rate peg, the aid must be large enough to substitute all 
private foreign lending capital which could quit the country at the official nominal exchange 
rate. Such a measure could be successful if shocks are temporary. 
Considering the bad equilibrium with zero investment, Krugman (1999) suggested that the 
main problem with the post-crisis rebuilding of the economy was that the entrepreneurs who 
drove investment and growth before the crisis are now effectively bankrupt and unable to 
raise capital. Our nuanced results about the severity of financial crisis following a foreign 
exchange crisis suggest that the post-crisis rebuilding of the economy could be looked with 
more optimism in the sense that, generally, the economy hit by a financial crisis can return to 
a rapid growth without waiting for foreign aid and a new set of entrepreneurs.  
In the dynamic setting, the situation depends on the initial levels of wealth and foreign 
currency debt of every individual entrepreneur. If the aggregate wealth of entrepreneurs after 
the devaluation of the domestic currency is high and only slightly affected by the twin crises, 
many entrepreneurs can survive. They are able to reimburse their foreign debt and continue to 
develop in a context with less competition and higher profitability since the investment level 
is lower. Then, this will create a new wave of development soon after the twin crises. In this 
case, the efforts focused on bank restructuring and recapitalization are sufficient.  
However, these efforts will not be sufficient in the case where the aggregate wealth after 
the devaluation is near zero or negative and most entrepreneurs have bankrupted. Even if a 
big wave of development can be initiated by non-bankrupted entrepreneurs once the dust of 
the crises is settled, the deep economic recession is too costly in the short run. Solutions 
proposed by Krugman, such as rescuing bankrupt entrepreneurs through some kind of “private   25
sector Brady Plan”, and/or growing a new set of entrepreneurs and/or welcoming foreign 
direct investment, are needed to reduce the negative economic and social consequences of the 
twin crises and to accelerate the economic recovery.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the dynamic implication of the Krugman’s (1999) model by extending it 
to explicitly take account of wealth accumulation and external equilibrium constraints. Our 
dynamic  analysis  complements  his  discussion  of  factors  susceptible  to  induce  financial 
fragility and crisis while suggesting some nuanced crisis scenarios and policy implications. 
This study has shown the existence of two equilibria. The equilibrium characterized by 
zero investment and zero foreign debt is unstable since a small amount of capital could put the 
economy  on  a  wealth-accumulation  path  leading  to  the  other  equilibrium  with  positive 
investment and zero debt. In this dynamic process, an economy largely exposed to foreign-
currency denominated debt can be hit by a financial crisis analyzed as a jump from one 
wealth-accumulation path to another one with lower investment and lower foreign debt. The 
violence of such a crisis will depend on the part of short-run debt in the total foreign debt. In 
contrast, Krugman obtained three equilibria through a static analysis. Thus, a financial crisis 
is considered as a jump from the equilibrium with high investment and high debt to the stable 
one where all entrepreneurs are bankrupt and do not invest.  
Furthermore, the dynamic analysis allows discriminating the severity of financial crises 
and their economic consequences according to the pre-crisis wealth. It allows gaining more 
intuition about the adjustments induced by different anti-crisis policy measures. In particular, 
our  analysis  suggests  that  even  during  a  severe  financial  crisis,  not  all  entrepreneurs  are 
bankrupt.  Since  these  having  survived  the  crisis  could  jump-start  a  wealth-accumulation 
process, policy measures other than bank restructuring and recapitalization are not always 
needed to rebuild the economy except when the consequences of such a crisis are very severe.   26
APPENDIX A: THE RELATIVE POSITION DE 
inv D  AND 
ee D
According to (22), 
inv D  is positive for  [
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As the denominator at the right hand of (A.2) is positive, it is straightforward to show that 
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Thus, we have 
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compatible with external equilibrium is higher (respectively equal to or lower) than the debt 
capacity  determined  by  the  leverage  constraint.  Rewrite  I ˆ   given  by  (18)  as 
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13 This corresponds to the second solution for  I using (19)-(21) and without taking account of (18). To solve it, 
we first use (20)-(21) to eliminate  D  and to express 
!* ! " p I  in terms of  I  and substitute then the latter in (19) 
to express  p in terms of  I . Finally, using 
!* ! " p I  and  p expressed in  I  and (20) (or (21)) to solve for  D ,  I  
and  p .    27
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